L’Agente Zeta: a Historical Profile of Guido Giannettini
The son of a Navy officer from Naples, Guido Giannettini was born on August 22, 1930, in the port city of Taranto. Not much is known about his family aside from the fact that they came from a fascist background, something he himself never shied away from. Giannettini embraced far-right politics going as far as to consider the day Hitler assumed power (January 30), the start of the March on Rome (October 28) and the day Pope Leo III crowned Charlemagne Holy Roman Emperor (December 25) as holidays.[1] As a student, Giannettini performed poorly and failed many classes because he didn’t find them interesting.[2] In college, this situation didn’t change and he would study political science for ten years only because he didn’t want to disappoint his father.[3]
As a young adult, Giannettini became a card-carrying member of the Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI), Italy’s main neo-fascist party, and began to write about history, politics, and the military for various magazines.[4] Eventually, he was called up for his mandatory military service. It was during this service that Giannettini became a second lieutenant in the Italian reserves.[5] While in the army, he was allegedly noticed by General Giuseppe Aloja, then Chief of Staff of the Italian Army, who observed in Giannettini a “precise preparation in terms of strategy and military techniques" leading Giannettini to eventually write articles for the la Rivista Militare.[6] It would be his keen interest in military matters would play a key role in defining his professional career.
What follows is an overview of Guido Giannettini’s life. An omnipresent figure during the years of lead, the journalist turned informer for the Italian secret service would come to play a key role in some of the more violent and mysterious episodes of the Italian Republic’s history.
Early Political Life
As alluded to previously, Giannettini’s involvement in politics started at a young age and was characterized by his links to the MSI through its adjacent youth groups. He was a member of the Giovane Italia, a student association parallel to the MSI which would eventually merge with other organizations in 1971 giving rise to the MSI’s official youth group, the Fronte della Gioventù (FdG).[7] Giannettini rose through the ranks eventually becoming a key figure within the organization and, at the age of 27, was given the responsibility of establishing links with like-minded groups abroad.[8] To this end, Giannettini was sent to attend meetings in Madrid whose purpose was to establish links between the Spanish, Portuguese, French, and Italian far-right which also involved OAS members.[9] It is in this context that Giannettini becomes a key Italian supporter of the French clandestine army forming a tight relationship with members of OAS-Metro and traveling multiple times to both France and Spain in order to meet with the organization’s leaders.[10] This relationship was apparently born out of Giannettini’s right-wing pro-Atlanticist beliefs.[11]
In 1961, during one of these trips, Giannettini would be arrested alongside OAS operatives, including founding member Pierre Lagaillarde and others.[12] The context behind this arrest is made clearer thanks to a letter he sent to his friend and OAS member Giacomo Gagliardi.[13] Giannettini writes how he “was also arrested with Joseph Ortiz, Lagaillarde, Argoud, Lacheroy, and others” in Madrid after what he describes as “anti-fascist and Masonic subversion” had promised the OAS’s founder General Raoul Salan funds if he eliminated the fascist within the organization and “if the OAS declared its loyalty to the Republic and its democratic institutions.”[14] This, of course, is Giannettini’s conspiratorial reading of the situation, but what is certain is that Giannettini and “the main ultras of Madrid” were arrested by the Brigada Politico-Social only to be freed a short time later while the OAS chiefs were brought to the Canary Islands.[15] The remainder of the letter showcases Giannettini’s opinion on how the OAS must show internal cohesion and his openness toward establishing a relationship with Gagliardi’s contact Henri Coston.[16]
Giannettini’s activities with the OAS in Spain were not only known to the Francoist government but members of the Falange had allegedly participated in events he attended. In an article appearing in l’Europeo, Giannettini is said to have attended a mass at la Baja de Los Caidos in 1961 with members of the OAS and representatives of the Spanish general staff.[17] During the mass, Giannettini was consecrated as a “Captain of the Crusade.”
After leaving Giovane Italia, in 1958 he was among the first to establish the Movimento Nazionale Italiano (MNS), another MSI adjacent organization funded by the monarchist senator Achille Lauro which sought to unite those who opposed both MSI secretary Arturo Michelini and the parties left-wing.[18] While open about his neo-fascist beliefs, Giannettini held pro-Atlanticist views which put him at odds with the “spiritualist,” Evolian, and left-wing factions of the MSI. That notwithstanding, he would form ties with key members of the neofascist movement Ordine Nuovo (ON), including its leader Pino Rauti. The group, made up of former members of the MSI’s spiritualist wing who abandoned the party in 1956, would play a defining role in Giannettini’s future legal troubles but at no point did he join the organization.
Journalistic and other writing endeavors
In addition to political activism, one of the other few constants in Giannettini’s life was his propensity to write. Whether it be about politics, history, geostrategy, or military matters, writing was an activity he would carry out up until his death. This led to him pursuing a career in journalism, contributing mainly to right-wing and military outlets. These include but aren’t limited to, Il Secolo d’Italia, Il Borghese, l’Italiano, and Lo Specchio, the latter of which he wrote under the pseudonym Adriano Corso.[19] Each of these publications was tied to the MSI or Italian fascism in one way or another.[20] Additionally, he collaborated with the daily newspaper il Tempo, the news agency Oltremare (see Guido Giannettini and Aginter Press and The SID Connection), and the military general staff journal Rivista Militare where wrote extensively about tanks, his area of expertise.[21]
Giannettini’s work in the world of journalism didn’t always see him behind a typewriter. In 1972, he was made the director of the MSI-affiliated news agency Destra Nazionale.[22] Allegedly, the then MSI secretary Giorgio Almirante himself had given him this role.[23] According to the testimony of journalist Giorgio Torchia, the role of Destra Nazionale was to provide information with a right-wing orientation and Giannettini was chosen since no one at the time suspected he was involved in the events of 1969 (see The Padova Connection).[24]
In 1965 Giannettini co-writes his first book with Mario Prisco and Adriano Romualdi entitled Drieu La Rochelle: il mito dell'Europa (Drieu La Rochelle: the myth of Europe).[25] In it, the authors explore the ideas of French novelist and collabo Pierre Drieu La Rochelle and in particular analyzes his understanding of what Europe is as an idea.[26] Adriano Romualdi, who Giannettini had called his friend, is an important figure within the Italian far-right matrix. The son of MSI president Pino Romualdi, the younger Romualdi was the preeminent thinker of Italian neofascist Europeanism, the chief interpreter of philosopher Julius Evola’s thought, and an author of many books with topics ranging from the Conservative Revolution in Germany to the origins of Indo-European culture.[27] While the analysis of Drieu La Rochelle’s thought was Giannettini’s first long-form project, the book was eclipsed in popularity by another one he co-authored just one year later with his friend and ON’s leader Pino Rauti.
Guido Giannettini and Pino Rauti
The genesis of their relationship remains obscure. According to Giannettini, the two met in the 1950’s and their friendship would last up until he fled the country in 1973.[28] This relationship was apparently born when both men were in the MSI, and little information is available as to why and in what exact context the two started a working relationship. As mentioned previously, Giannettini collaborated with the newspaper il Tempo as a journalist during the same period Rauti worked as the newspaper’s editor.[29]
Rauti and Giannettini’s partnership was a productive one and in 1966 resulted in the publication of Le Mani Rosse sulle Forze Armate (The Red Hands on the Armed Forces). Published under the pseudonym Flavio Messalla, the book was commissioned by the aforementioned general Aloja to attack the chief of staff of the Italian army General Giovanni De Lorenzo for depoliticizing the Italian armed forces.[30] The reason for this was that Aloja, who had served as chief of staff prior to De Lorenzo, and reactionary forces in Italy believed De Lorenzo, in the name of neutrality vis-à-vis the political parties active in the country, was allowing for communist infiltration.[31] The personal rivalry between the two men was spurred by the fact De Lorenzo abolished Aloja’s political courses.[32] As a result, the former head of the chief of staff sought to attack his rival by using the skills of the two journalists.[33]
This decision would ultimately backfire for Aloja since making a confrontation within the armed forces public knowledge wasn’t advisable. Eventually, Aloja was pressured into pulling the book out of circulation.[34] Both Rauti and Giannettini would be compensated for the unexpected decision to stop the sale of the book. Rauti would receive 350 thousand lira in compensation while the amount given to Giannettini is unknown, but it is suspected to be close to if not the same amount given to his colleague.[35]
Rauti and Giannettini would collaborate on one more project three years later. Along with other Italian journalists, the duo would embark on a long trip to Germany in September of 1969 as reporters for the Associazione per l’Amicizia Italo-Germanica (Association for Italian-German Friendship), an organization created by journalist Gino Ragno with the expressed purpose of helping to bring about German unification which had also previously aided ON members in establishing contacts with extremists in Germany.[36] According to court documents from the Catanzaro trial of 1976, the trip was organized by Ragno’s association in conjunction with the German embassy in Rome and its expressed purpose was to help Italian journalists better understand the German army’s organization and inner workings.[37]
The main stop during this tour of Germany was at a Bundeswehr “experimental pavilion” in Bavaria where the journalists were shown the new Leopard I tanks.[38] Proof as to their participation in these events exists thanks to the fact that a Bundeswehr photographer captured images of the two men whing inspecting the tanks.[39] After inspecting the new tanks, the Italian journalists were shown the Krauss-Maffei installations, where the Leopard tanks were produced, the Bundeswehr’s tank exercise camp, and finally the Schule der Bundeswehr für innere Führung, the army’s leadership center.[40]
While Giannettini would restate that the trip was journalistic in nature, the court documents indicate that he “clearly implied that the journalistic cover, in reality, served to hide the true objective of the visit, that it was done to represent the General Staff.”[41] The final leg of the tour saw the Italian journalists in Bonn where they were joined by the newly elected Chancellor Willy Brandt and his Defense Minister Helmut Schmidt at the Italian embassy.[42] The context behind this last meeting is unclear but, since the purpose of the trip was to better acquaint the Italians with the German army’s inner workings, a meeting with the Defense Minister would make sense.
The Centro Studi Alberto Pollio and the Parco dei Principi Conference
Rauti and Giannettini, in their capacity as journalists, would play an active role within another MSI adjacent institution, the Centro Studi Alberto Pollio (or alternatively Istituto Pollio). Created in 1964, the Istituto Pollio was a joint initiative of journalist and SID agent Eggardo Beltrametti, Gianfranco Finaldi, Pino Rauti, Guido Giannettini, and count Enrico De Boccard, the latter becoming the institute’s president.[43] The short-lived institute emerged during the crisis of Italy’s first center-left government and was financed in part by a group of industrialists from Milan headed by knight Gino Gastaldi.[44] While appearing as a study center, the Istituto Pollio’s ambition was to become a node that united right-wing political, cultural, sports, and economic organizations.[45]
Between the third and fifth of May of 1965, the Istituto Pollio hosted a conference in Rome at the Hotel Parco dei Principi called the Convegno sulla guerra rivoluzionaria (Conference on Revolutionary Warfare.)[46]
Sponsored by the Defense Chiefs of Staff, the themes of the conference included communist infiltration and propaganda along with the defense of Western values.[47] The attendees come from all over the Italian far-right constellation but it’s worth noting the presence of Stefano delle Chiaie, leader of the neo-fascist organization Avanguardia Nazionale.[48] Among the speakers, which include journalists, politicians, academics, and army officers, is Guido Giannettini whose presentation is entitled La Varietà delle Tecniche nella Condotta della Guerra Rivoluzionaria (The Variety of Techniques in the Conduct of Revolutionary Warfare).[49] The following is a summary of the presentation. Giannettini begins by addressing what the fundamental concepts of revolutionary warfare are with his main argument being that revolutionary communists, namely Mao Tse-Tung, adapted existing ideas, such as those of General Carl von Clausewitz, rather than fully developing a new theory.[50]
Following this introductory section, the presentation is broken down into four sections which cover the step-by-step process by which revolution warfare comes about. The first phase, or preparation, sees the revolutionaries set the groundwork for their actions by establishing what the state’s weak points are in preparation for the second phase, propaganda.[51] During the latter phase, the revolutionaries chose the themes they wished to deploy based on whom they sought to attack.[52] The third phase, entitled propaganda-infiltration, involves the combination of both aspects in order to seize control over the various targeted environments.[53] As Giannettini writes, “infiltration can take place in various environments: from more or less overtly political associations to cultural groups.”[54] Finally, the last stage is reached, action. For Giannettini, action can mean either the “legal conquest of power in European countries like Italy or violent actions (attacks, acts of sabotage, guerrilla warfare) more common in non-European countries.”[55] The final section of his presentation paints an ominous picture:
“The decision, therefore, largely depends on us. It depends precisely on us Italians, who are living (sometimes without fully realizing it) this insidious battle. If we are finally able to open our eyes, open our eyes to the revolutionary war, if we can react appropriately, then, and only then, will we be able to recover and win. But be careful: it is late. Very late. Il est moins cinq says Suzanne Labin in one of her recent books. We have reached the last five minutes.”[56]
By 1965, Giannettini is a man of many faces. Both in his home country and abroad, the journalist is known to members of terrorist organizations, neo-fascist parties, and generals. However, it would be his eventual connections with the Italian secret services in the coming years that would shape his future forever.
The SID Connection and Legal Entanglements
Giannettini states that his collaboration with the Italian secret service agency Servizio informazioni difesa (SID) began in 1966 as an “indirect relations” with the intelligence service.[57] Since Giannettini’s responsibilities included gathering information on international affairs, he reported to the R Department, whose purpose was to conduct research and information gathering.
In his testimony given on September 26, 1974, Giannettini clarified that this initial relationship with the SID was indirect in that he at no point was in contact with the intelligence service and it was his boss, Giorgio Torchia, through his news agency Oltremare, which was funded in part by the SID, that would serve as the bridge between the organization and Giannettini.[58] While the R Department would continue to receive information and studies provided by Giannettini via Torchia, the relationship was taken a step forward when Giannettini came into direct contact as an “external collaborator” with the D Department, the organ which dealt with internal security.
Thanks to a letter written by Giannettini to General Gianadelio Maletti, the future head of the D Department, following the events surrounding his eventual escape from Italy (see Agent Z flees Italy) in order to illustrate for the general what sort of relationship had had with the SID, an overview of Giannettini’s relationship with the D Department can be traced.[59] According to the journalist, contact was established in 1967 thanks to Colonel Stefani, an officer of the Chief of Staff who reported to General Aloja.[60] Stefani, for whom Giannettini had written a report on CIA activities against the left in Europe, put him in contact with the leadership of the D Department in August, initially Colonel Fiorani and then Colonel Viola, with the latter serving as the department’s director during that period.[61] It is here that he is given the code name Zeta (Z).[62] Ultimately, Viola was replaced by Colonel Federico Gasca who would in turn introduce Giannettini to Maletti in September of 1971.[63]
The content of Giannettini’s reports varied from an analysis of the pro-Chinese groups in Italy to a profile on Simha Dinitz and Israeli intelligence, an analysis of Sino-Albanian relations to a study on the foreign policy of Yugoslavia, and more.[64] Additionally, Giannettini wrote a dossier on NATO following his visit to the alliance’s headquarters in Brussels where he met NATO General Secretary Manlio Brosio.[65] In his capacity as a SID informant, Giannettini created a “parallel network” of informants inside left-wing movements across Italy and proposed that a series of international networks be used to collect information on international politics.[66] The fourth section of the letter is titled Il Gruppo Veneto (The Veneto Group) and discusses the connections that existed between Giannettini and the neofascist group of Padova.
The Padova Cell
Much has been written about the neofascist organization based out of Padova and their involvement in the Piazza Fontana bombing, along with those on the trains in 1969, but an analysis of these events is beyond the scope of this paper.[67] What is important to know is that two key players within the group were Franco Freda, a lawyer, and Giovanni Ventura, an editor, who were ultimately found responsible for the bombing in 2005.[68] The period in which Giannettini came into contact with Freda and his cell remains unclear. According to the journalist, contact was made in either 1966 or 1967 but the discovery of Giannettini’s agenda indicated that the two might have known each other as early as 1964 since the name “Giorgio Freda” was written down on the eighth of August of that year.[69] How this partnership began, Giannettini states, was thanks to their mutual friend Adriano Romualdi.[70] Giannettini alleges that he was put in contact with Freda who, in addition to being a lawyer, ran a bookstore called Ezzelino which had a rare book he was looking for.[71]
Giannettini states that the SID asked him to dig up information on the extra-parliamentary left in Italy. At the time there were many pro-Chinese groups in Veneto, which Freda knew about, so Giannettini asked for the lawyer’s help in providing him with information on these groups.[72] Freda had introduced Giovanni Ventura to Giannettini during one of their visits telling him that Ventura frequently traveled to Rome, where Giannettini lived, and would help provide information that way. Giannettini would allege that at no point did the two men know he was compiling this information on the extra-parliamentary left for the SID rather he had told them he was simply interested in making dossiers on the far left in exchange for summaries of events on international affairs.[73]
During his interrogation in July of 1993, Giannettini explained that, to make the summaries he provided them seem more “impressive” he would write two made-up codes, “KSD” and “RSD.”[74] On December 12, 1969, a bomb exploded in the Banca Nazionale dell’Agricoltura in Piazza Fontana, a few steps from the center of Milan. Ventura, and subsequently Freda, were both implicated in the bombing after a friend of Ventura, Guido Lorenzon, informed the police that the editor was involved.[75] During the investigation, the documents Giannettini had provided the duo were discovered in a safe deposit box owned by Ventura’s aunt. When asked about their origin, Ventura stated they were Giannettini’s turning the investigation onto the journalist.[76] However, Giannettini was nowhere to be found.
Agent Z flees Italy.
By the time Giannettini had become a person of interest, the SID helped the journalist escape to Paris.[77] The journalist would go on to explain that on April 9, 1973, SID agent Antonio Labruna, who worked in the D Department and was allegedly introduced to Giannettini by General Maletti, told him he had to leave the country because the investigations were zeroing in on him.[78] Giannettini stated:
“[…] Labruna told me that I should never reveal my identity as a SID informer. I agreed. I accepted that I’d go to Paris … I received 200 thousand lira and that more would follow. This, indeed, would happen.”[79]
Allegedly, Giannettini’s self-imposed exile was supposed to end once the situation in Italy had died down, something which would never occur.[80] During the third and final trial dealing with the Piazza Fontana bombing, Giannettini would state that he stayed in France between April of 1973 to June 17, 1974, and allegedly sent notes on the French extra-parliamentary left, namely Trotskyist groups, to the SID for a short period of time.[81] During this, Giannettini would continue to receive money from the SID via Labruna who would meet him in Paris and would receive the reports Giannettini would compile for General Maletti.[82] On June 17 of the same year, Giannettini would depart France following a “routine police check.”[83] According to the journalist, one night in the apartment he was staying in, the police said they saw paper fall from a window in his building. A commissioner appeared and spoke to him in Italian, stating that a robbery happened in that building and that they would come back to ask him questions. He knew that he’d likely be discovered and left France for Spain with no clear plan in mind.[84] Years later Giannettini would state during a testimony that it was his intention to establish contact with the Spanish secret service through an agent he met in the past thanks to some “French right-wing friends.”[85]
The day after he left Paris, Giannettini arrived in Madrid and booked a room at the “Plaza” hotel.[86] Due to the cost of the hotel, he moved to another residence where, on June 27, he was stopped by the Spanish police who arrested him, searched his room for explosives, and ultimately brought him to the offices of the Seguridad Brigada Criminal.[87] Giannettini was taken in due to the fact that six days earlier Interpol had issued a warrant for his arrest. The Seguridad ultimately established that Giannettini’s case was political and turned him over to the Brigada Politico-Social who, after eight days, gave him two options: an extradition to Italy or they would permit him to travel to any country of his choosing. He ultimately settled in Argentina, and, with funds provided by the Spanish authorities, he departed for Buenos Aires the following day.[88]
Giannettini’s time in Argentina lasted a little over a month since on August 8, 1974, Giannettini, realizing the unstainable nature of his situation, turned himself in to the Italian embassy.[89] The journalist was questioned by the military liaison office and was eventually asked to stay in the embassy, rather than his hotel.[90] Five days later, Giannettini was sent back to Italy ending his nearly year and a half exile. His arrival in Milan was described as such:
"On the afternoon of August 14, Guido Giannettini, the former SID agent, landed at Linate Airport. Taken into custody by a group of police officers, Giannettini, after a brief exchange with two journalists, was transferred to San Vittore. Two days later, he was interrogated by the examining magistrate Gerardo D'Ambrosio, who, a few months earlier, had issued a warrant for his arrest for complicity in a massacre, and by the deputy prosecutors Luigi Fiasconaro and Emilio Alessandrini."[91]
During his reentry flight, Giannettini hand-wrote a twenty-page dossier entitled “Reconstruction of events that occurred in Italy.”[92] The document describes the three phases “of manipulation of extra-parliamentary groups on the left or (and) the right by foreign or internal pressure groups.”[93] What stands out in this report is that Giannettini clearly outlines how activists on the right tried to enmesh themselves in leftist groups, something that only emerged following the trials.
Interrogated by D’Ambrosio, Giannettini would initially lie about his situation and attempt to focus the attention of the investigation on leftist groups but quickly began to tell the truth.[94] After nearly five years, Giannettini was found guilty of the Piazza Fontana bombing along with Freda and Ventura and was sentenced to life in prison. However, on June 10, 1982, Giannettini was liberated after the court of appeals deemed there being a lack of evidence.[95]
Guido Giannettini and his Transnational Links
It is clear that Giannettini was active in various far-right groups in Italy and abroad during the Cold War. His relationship with the OAS (see Early Political Life) is well documented but I wouldn’t end there. Former members of the clandestine army, namely “De Massey, Meningaud, and Chevallet,” formed the Union méditerranéenne anti-communiste (Mediterranean anti-communist union), or Umac.[96] Giannettini, in addition to journalist Giorgio Torchia, had worked for the organization which received support from the Spanish and Portuguese authorities. Additionally, it is alleged that with other French colleagues, he created the Appareil Mondial Secret Fasciste International (International Fascist Secret Global Apparatus or AMSAR).[97] This organization supposedly existed between 1964 to 1971. In addition to France, Giannettini held ties with neofascist representatives in Greece. Konstantinos Plevris, the leader of the Metaxist 4th of August Party, had admitted that the two men met but the circumstances behind their encounter aren’t clear.[98]
Giannettini’s network expanded into the Iberian peninsula thanks to his contacts in both Portugal and Spain. In Salazarist Portugal, Giannettini had ties with the Legião Portuguesa (Portuguese Legion), a paramilitary group backed by the state, through its head of information, Gomes Lopes.[99] Since 1962, coincidentally around the same time Giannettini was nurturing his relationship with the OAS, the Italian journalist provided the Legion with “confidential information.”[100] In Spain, as discussed previously (see Early Political Life and Agent Z flees Italy), Giannettini was in contact with members of the Spanish far-right and its government officials. This is confirmed by a note sent to the SID by the Dirección Nacional de Seguridad (National Security Directorate) which states that Giannettini had not only collaborated with the Francoist secret services but that in October of 1973, shortly after fleeing Italy, he met with “neo-Nazi activists.”[101]
Guido Giannettini and Aginter Press.
A key node in Giannettini’s transitional links was Aginter Press (AP). Under the guise of a press agency, AP was an international anti-communist organization involved in disseminating propaganda and conducting armed mercenary activity.[102] The group was directed by former French army officer and OAS operative Yves Guillou, better known under the alias Yves-Guérin Sérac. Allegedly, Giannettini had known Sérac since 1964. During a meeting in Lisbon, OAS operative Rene Souetre presented Serac to him as “Ralf,” his code name.[103] Giannettini states that:
“Around the years 1963-64, I was in contact with people who were part of the OAS. During a meeting with these people in Lisbon, I was introduced to a certain Ralf without any further explanation. However, I understood that this person was either part of or close to the OAS. I never saw this person again, and in later years, I heard from someone, though I don't remember who, that Ralf was identified as Guerin Sérac.”[104]
During this meeting, Giannettini was joined by Enzo Generali, a former MSI turned ON activist who held ties with Prince Junio Valerio Borghese and allegedly Otto Skorzeny.[105] Both men had become friends with OAS operatives and for this reason they were in Lisbon.[106] He goes on to clarify that, years later when working for the SID, General Gasca Queirazza, the then head of the SID “D” department, asked him to provide information to Sérac which he subsequently did.[107] The document is dated June 12, 1970, and describes Serac as an ex-captain in the French army in contact with Jean Souètre, another OAS member.[108] Additionally, Sérac is identified as having been in Cameroon and in Congo with French mercenary Robert Denard.
While Giannettini never denies having met Guérin Sérac, he was more than simply aware of the organization. In the archives of AP discovered by the journalists from l’Europeo, a series of contact cards were discovered listing the names of Aginter operatives.[109] Giannettini’s name appeared in the list and was classified as such:
H1 (should be treated with caution)
GIANNETINI GUIDO
Via delle Fornaci 64 ROMA 6 between 1962-63
Tied to Pino RAUTI of Ordine Nuovo
Forms, with some comrades, during the years of ‘58, the “Formazioni Nazionali Giovanili”
Profession: Journalist
Has contacted the Portuguese Legion in 1962-63 following which he sent a report to Gomes Lopes, the then attaché in the service of the Legion “SECURITE.”
The “H1” classification denotes him as an Aginter collaborator, rather than a full-time operative, likely referring to the links between Aginter and the Italian news agencies Oltremare and l’Italiano.[110] What’s particularly interesting from this document is that Aginter operatives note that he must be “treated with caution”. Since there is no date on the document, it is difficult to ascertain why this note appears on his profile, but it is possible that his strong relationship with members of the Italian armed forces could cast doubt on where his true loyalties lied. Additionally, the profile isn’t entirely accurate since it erroneously states that Giannettini in 1958 had participated in the formation the Formazioni Nazionali Giovanili when in reality he helped create the MNS that year.
Later life, Publications, and Death
While officially acquitted, Giannettini’s role as a SID informant and his involvement in the Piazza Fontana trial would linger over him for the rest of his life. After the trial, Giannettini devoted his time to publishing books whose themes were primarily focused on geopolitics and military affairs.[111] He would also appear in documentaries on Operation Gladio and Piazza Fontana where he described his relationship with the SID, the Padova cell, and his relationship with the Italian right.[112] Only one book was published posthumously on Giannettini by author Mary Pace who established friendship with the journalist.[113] On May 12, 2003, Giannettini died in Rome at the age of 62 due to complications from diabetes.
This article has sought to present a historical profile of Guido Giannettini by highlighting his political and journalistic endeavors. Giannettini remains a particularly interesting protagonist of the years of lead due to his direct link to the SID, relationship with the executors of the Piazza Fontana bombing, and transnational connections to neofascist organizations. While some allege that his involvement in intelligence and terrorist activities extends beyond what is currently known, concrete evidence is still lacking. Regardless, Giannettini was a pivotal node in the formation of the transnational far-right.
[1] Mary Pace, Piazza Fontana. L'inchiesta: parla Giannettini (Roma: Armando Curcio Editore, 2008), p. 23
[2] Ibid, p.23
[3] Ibidem
[4] Ibid. p. 23-24
[5] Frédéric Laurent, l’Orchestre Noir (Paris: Stock, 1978), p. 193.
[6] Pace, Piazza Fontana, p. 24
[7] Piero Ignazi, Il Polo Escluso la Fiamma che non si Spegne: da Almirante a Meloni (Bologna: il Mulino, 2023), p. 72.
[8] Domenico Sorrenti, “Il neofascismo nell'Italia Meridionale tra eversione e legalità,” (PhD diss., Università della Calabria, 2017), p. 173
[9] CdM, Verbale di Interrogatorio di Guido Giannettini, May 15, 1997, 20383, D/b-6, p. 4.
[10] Pauline Picco, Liaisons dangereuses. Les extrêmes droits en France et en Italie (1960-1984) (Rennes: PUR, 2016), p. 39.
[11] Ibid, p.40.
[12] Andrea Mammone, Transnational Neofascism in France and Italy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), p. 115.
[13] Giacomo Gagliardi was an MSI activist and member of OAS-Metro who held ties the far-right in Belgium, Spain, Portugal, and West Germany. In Paris, Gagliardi served as the representative of the association of Italian nationalists. Since he was an Italian OAS operative, this would allegedly make him the first of only two Italians to receive an OAS membership card, with the other being ON member Clemente Graziani. See Picco, Liaisons dangereuses, p. 39; Georges Fleury, Histoire secrète de l'OAS (Paris: Grasset, 2002), p. 556; Aldo Giannuli and Elia Rosati, Storia di Ordine Nuovo. La più pericolosa organizzazione neofascista degli anni Settanta (Milano: Mimesis, 2017), p. 29.
[14] CdM, Letter from Guido Giannettini to Giacomo Gagliardi, January 2, 1961, 82-A, Processo di Catanzaro.
[15] Ibidem; Giannettini also mentions in the letter that he was arrested with another camerata who we can deduce is likely Enzo Generali (see Guido Giannettini and Aginter Press) since both men traveled to Spain together to meet with OAS operatives and, according to recovered intelligence documents, both men had visited Ortiz in Spain together (see Commissione stragi, Legami tra MSI e terrorismo neofascista, April 26, 2001, p. 277).
[16] Ibid.
[17] Ferdinando Scianna, “Un Governo in Esilio della Destra Italiana? Giannettini sarebbe stato arrestato a Madrid,” l’Europeo N. 28, 1974.
[18] Domenico Sorrenti, “Il neofascismo nell'Italia Meridionale tra eversione e legalità,” (PhD diss., Università della Calabria, 2017), p. 152-153
[19] Mirco Dondi, L’eco del boato. Storia della strategia della tensione 1965-1974 (Bari: Editori Laterza, 2015), p. 69.
[20] Il Secolo d’Italia was the official newspaper of the MSI, Il Borghese was a monthly magazine directed for the majority of its existence by MSI member Mario Tedeschi, l’Italiano was a publication run by MSI founding member Pino Romualdi, and Lo Specchio was a weekly publication created by Italo-American fascist Giorgio Nelson Page.
[21] See Guido Giannettini, “Il carro da combattimento,” Rivista Militare, 1965; Guido Giannettini “I carri del 1970,” Rivista Militare, 1966; Guido Giannettini, “I carri armati leggeri,” Rivista Militare, 1967; Guido Giannettini, “Considerazioni sul caccia carri,” Rivista Militare, 1970.
[22] Dondi, L’eco del boato, p. 78
[23] Imputazioni del Processo di Catanzaro, June 7, 1976, ARC.67.V.1/4.2, p. 5
[24] Dondi, L’eco del boato, p. 78
[25] Adriano Romualdi et al., Drieu La Rochelle: il mito dell'Europa (Roma: Edizioni del Solstizio, 1965)
[26] Ibid.
[27] Mammone, Transnational Neofascism in France and Italy, p. 86; Giannettini was also close to Evola but details about their relationship remain unclear. What is known is that Giannettini had introduced French author Dominique de Roux to Evola, ON representative Paolo Andriani, and MSI representative Giulio Maceratini during the Frenchman’s’ visit to Italy in 1967. Giannettini states that he became close with De Roux through their mutual friend Jean Parvulesco (see CdM, Interrogation of Guido Giannettini, Catanzaro Trial, February 2, 1976, p. 2).
[28] CdM, Verbale di Interrogatorio di Guido Giannettini, May 15, 1997, D/b-6, p. 5.
[29] CdM, Verbale di Interrogatorio di Guido Giannettini, December 5, 1997, D/b-6, p.2.
[30] Giannuli and Rosati, Storia di Ordine Nuovo, p. 49
[31] This assertion is ironic since De Lorenzo was not only the mastermind behind the Piano Solo, an anti-communist contingency plan, but would also serve as an MSI representative in the Chamber of Deputies between 1971-1973 alongside Pino Rauti.
[32] Giuseppe De Lutiis, I Servizi Segreti in Italia. Dal Fascismo all'Intelligence del XXI Secolo (Milano: Sperling & Kupfer, 2010), p.78
[33] The reason why Giannettini and Pino Rauti were picked to write this book together was due to the intervention of Eggardo Beltrametti, journalist and friend of Aloja. Due to Giannettini’s knowledge of military matters, in particular tanks, and Rauti’s longstanding career as a journalist, Beltrametti, with Aloja’s support, gave the duo the responsibility of writing the article. See Gianni Flamini, Il partito del golpe 1964-1968 (Ferrara: Italo Bovolenta, 1981), p. 126.
[34] Giannuli and Rosati, Storia di Ordine Nuovo, p. 50.
[35] Ibidem.
[36] Imputazioni del Processo di Catanzaro, June 7, 1976, ARC.67.V.1/4.7, p.3; Commissione stragi, Legami tra MSI e terrorismo neofascista, April 26, 2001, p. 276
[37] Imputazioni del Processo di Catanzaro, June 7, 1976, ARC.67.V.1/4.7, p.4; It was later discovered that Giovanni Ventura (see The Padova Cell) was the local secretary of the association between 1966-65 (see Ibio Paolucci, “Aggravata la Posizione di Giannettini dopo altre Sei Ore di Interrogatorio,” l’Unità, August 18, 1974, p. 5)
[38] Ibid, p. 2
[39] Ibidem
[40] Imputazioni del Processo di Catanzaro, June 7, 1976, ARC.67.V.1/4.7, p.5
[41] Ibid, p. 3
[42] Ibid, p. 6
[43] Flamini, Il partito del golpe 1964-1968, p. 84; Dondi, L’eco del boato, p. 64; For more on De Boccard see Giannuli and Rosati, Storia di Ordine Nuovo, p. 30-32
[44] Giannuli and Rosati, Storia di Ordine Nuovo, p. 33
[45] Ibid, p. 34
[46] Eggardo Beltrametti, La Guerra Rivoluzionaria. Atti del Primo Convegno organizzato dall’Istituto Pollio (Milano: Volpe Editore, 1965)
[47] Ignazi, Il Polo Escluso, p. 112; Franco Ferraresi, Threats to Democracy: The Radical Right in Italy after the War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), p. 71
[48] Tribunale Civile e Penale di Milano Ufficio Istruzione sez.20, “Sentenza Ordinanza su Piazza Fontana,” March 18, 1995, p. 281; Commissione stragi, Legami tra MSI e terrorismo neofascista, April 26, 2001, p.276.
[49] Some of the speakers at the conference were Pino Rauti, Giano Accame, Pio Filippani Ronconi, Gino Ragno, Giorgio Torchia, Eggardo Beltrametti, and Fausto Gianfranceschi. For the complete list see Beltrametti, La Guerra Rivoluzionaria.
[50] See Guido Giannettini, “La Varietà delle Tecniche nella Condotta della Guerra Rivoluzionaria” in Beltrametti, La Guerra Rivoluzionaria, p. 151-153
[51] Ibid, p. 154-156
[52] Ibid, p. 156-161
[53] Ibid, p. 161-168
[54] Ibid, p. 161
[55] Ibid, p. 168
[56] Ibid, p. 169
[57] CdM, Verbale di Interrogatorio di Guido Giannettini, July 16, 1993, D/b-6, p. 1.
[58] CdM, Verbale di Interrogatorio Guido Giannettini, September 26, 1974, D/b-6; Giannettini describes this relationship by stating “Torchia would tell me he needed a study, and I would provide it to him.”
[59] The letter is reproduced in its entirety in Mary Pace’s book on Giannettini and the author has taken information from this reproduction.
[60] Pace, Piazza Fontana, p. 201-202
[61] Ibid, p. 202
[62] Ibid, p. 25; Pace, in her biography of Giannettini, writes that he chose the name himself however Giannettini would claim that the term Agente Zeta was journalistic invention (see AccasFilm, “Guido Giannettini intervistato da Enzo Biagi,” AccasFilm, October 20, 2010,
[63] Ibid, p. 202; The exact date is unclear since Maletti alleges that he first met Giannettini in June of 1971 (see Parliamentary hearing of General Gianadelio Maletti in Johannesburg, Commissione Stragi, March 3, 1997)
[64] Ibid, p. 202-204
[65] CdM, Note written by Guido Giannettini for Judge Migliaccio, Processo di Catanzaro, 23 April, 1975, p. 2
[66] Pace, Piazza Fontana, p. 204-205; The international networks proposed included were located in Eastern Europe, Germany, the United States, Switzerland, and one with Serb exiles from Yugoslavia.
[67] For those interested in the history of the bombing and the subsequent trials see Aldo Giannuli, Storia della "Strage di Stato," (Firenze: Ponte alle Grazie, 2019), Benedetta Tobagi, Piazza Fontana, (Milano: Einaudi, 2019), Giorgio Boatti, Piazza Fontana 12 dicembre 1969: il giorno dell'innocenza perduta, (Milano: Einaudi, 2019), Guido Salvini and Andrea Sceresini, La maledizione di Piazza Fontana. L'indagine interrotta. I testimoni dimenticati. La guerra tra i magistrati, (Milano: Chiarelettere, 2019).
[68] Alberto Magnani, “Strage Piazza Fontana, cosa è successo a Milano il 12 dicembre 1969,”Il Sole 24 Ore, December 11, 2019.
[69] Pace, Piazza Fontana, p. 206; CdM, Verbale di Interrogatorio di Guido Giannettini, July 16, 1993, D/b-6, p. 4; Giorgio was Freda’s middle name.
[70] Testimony of Guido Giannettini, Processo per la strage di Piazza Fontana a Milano del 12 dicembre 1969, “Radio Radicale,” May 25, 2000.
[71] Ibid; Romualdi would die in a car accident in 1973 making it impossible to verify Giannettini’s statement.
[72] Ibid; While Freda wasn’t a Communist, he knew people in these organizations since Padova was small and his friend Giovanni Ventura had contacts within the pro-Chinese groups.
[73] Ibid.
[74] CdM, Verbale di Interrogatorio di Guido Giannettini, July 16, 1993, D/b-6, p. 2.
[75] Laurent, l’Orchestre Noir, p. 12-13 ; An interesting series of events transpired around the same time of the bombing which involved Giannettini. During the period in which the bombing in Milan occurred, two articles were published by Giannettini under the pseudonym Adriano Corso in Lo Specchio entitled “We discovered the subversive cells” and “Report on the Italian revolutionary commandos,” two articles which attacked left-wing organizations. Furthermore, on December 27, 1969, days after the bombing, Giannettini visited Padova and met with both Freda and Ventura, but this was allegedly to obtain more information for the SID. While Giannettini was eventually absolved of any culpability in the bombing, the series of events which transpired around the time of the bombing are unusual (see Flamini, Il partito del golpe 1968-1970, p. 42).
[76] Ibid, p. 194.
[77] Anna Cento Bull, Italian Neofascism: The Strategy of Tension and the Politics of Nonreconciliation (New York City: Berghahn Books, 2012), p. 47.
[78] Gianni Flamini, Il partito del golpe 1974-1974 (Ferrara: Italo Bovolenta, 1983), p. 316;
[79] Ibid, p. 316-17.
[80] Testimony of Guido Giannettini, Processo per la strage di Piazza Fontana a Milano del 12 dicembre 1969, “Radio Radicale,” May 25, 2000.
[81] Ibid; Pace, Piazza Fontana, p. 229
[82] Giuseppe Catalano, “Resistere fino all’ultima sigaretta,” L’Espresso, December 1, 1974; Pace, Piazza Fontana, p. 231
[83] Pace, Piazza Fontana, p. 230
[84] Testimony of Guido Giannettini, Processo per la strage di Piazza Fontana a Milano del 12 dicembre 1969, “Radio Radicale,” May 25, 2000.
[85] Ibid. Giannettini does not provide the names of these right-wing Frenchmen.
[86] Guido Giannettini, “Indovina chi veniva a cena,” l’Espresso, October 4, 1981, p. 26.
[87] Ibid, p. 27
[88] Ibid, p.27-28; Giannettini stated in the article written in 1981 that he chose Argentina due to the favorable political situation there but in 2000, during another deposition, he would state that he picked the South American nation since he had friends there. It is unclear which is the truth or if it’s a mix of both.
[89] Giannettini would also go on to state that following an interview given by the then defense minister Giulio Andreotti wherein he stated that Giannettini had served as a SID agent there was no reason for him to remain on the run.
[90] Ibid, p. 28-29.
[91] “Le verità conquistate sulle trame nere rompono il muro delle alte collusioni,” l’Unità, December 12, 1974, p. 5.
[92] CdM, Ricostruzione avvenimenti Italiani, August 14, 1974, D/b-6
[93] Ibid.
[94] Flamini, Il partito del golpe 1973-74, p. 636
[95] Piazza Fontana, racconto di una strage, (2005, Rai)
[96] CdM, Relazione di Consulenza, Procedimento penale. 91/97 mod. 21., Procura di Brescia, September 15, 1998, p. 41.
[97] Laurent, l’Orchestre Noir, p. 193; Ferdinando Scianna, “Un Governo in Esilio della Destra Italiana? Giannettini sarebbe stato arrestato a Madrid,” l’Europeo N. 28, 1974.
[98] Dimitri Deliolanes, Colonelli (Frosinone: Fandango, 2019) p. 169; Plevris was also in contact with Pino Rauti and other operatives within ON.
[99] Maria José Tiscar, A Contra-Revolução no 25 de Abril (Lisbon: Edições Colibri, 2014), p. 210.
[100] Ibidem.
[101] Flamini, Il partito del golpe 1973-74, p. 452
[102] An investigation of Aginter Press is beyond the scope of this paper. For more information see Andrea Sceresini, Internazionale Nera (Milan: Chiarelettere, 2017); Maria José Tiscar, A Contra-Revolução no 25 de Abril (Lisbon: Edições Colibri, 2014); Picco, Liaisons dangereuses, p. 131-155; Laurent, l’Orchestre Noir, p. 115-165
[103] CdM, Verbale di Interrogatorio di Guido Giannettini, May 15, 1997, D/b-6, p. 4.
[104] CdM, Verbale di Interrogatorio di Guido Giannettini, May 15, 1997, D/b-6, p. 4.
[105] Commissione stragi, I tentativi golpisti, April 26, 2001, p.170; Giannettini was likely also in contact with Borghese but the specifics behind this connection are unclear. What is known is that “X Borghese” was found written in his 1963 agenda with the X likely referring to the X Mas, the commando group Borghese ran during the Second World War (see CdM Guido Giannettini Agenda, 1963, Catanzaro Trial, G/a-80).
[106] CdM, Verbale di Interrogatorio di Guido Giannettini, September 2, 1993, B/b-3
[107] Ibidem
[108] CdM, Appunto SID su Guerin Serac fornito da Guido Giannettini, June 12, 1970, D/b-6.
[109] CdM, Schede Contatti - Giannettini etc, B/f 19.
[110] Corrado Incerti et al., "Giornalisti italiani al servizio dell’agenzia terroristica," L’Europeo, November 28, 1974; Laurent, l’Orchestre Noir, p. 132.
[111] Guido Giannettini and Fabrizio Malhamè, Vietnam apocalisse inutile (Rome: Cirrapico, 1984); Guido Giannettini, URSS il crollo (Rome: Settimo Sigillo, 1992)
[112] Timewatch: Gladio: The Ringmasters, directed by Alan Francovitch. (1992, BBC Two); L'Orchestre noir, directed by Jean-Michel Meurice. (1997, Betacam SP)
[113] See Mary Pace, Piazza Fontana. L'inchiesta: parla Giannettini (Rome: Armando Curcio Editore, 2008). The book has been criticized for presenting a superficial investigation into Giannettini’s life.